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The Lanham Trade-Mark Act of 19461 is the result of years of work by busi-
ness, bar, and Congress to secure comprehensive and uniform legislation in the field
of trade-marks and unfair competition Prior to the effective date of the Lanham
Act,3 the law of trade-marks and unfair competition was a patchwork of federal
and state law. It is the purpose of this paper to examine the extent to which the
Lanham Act has brought order and uniformity to the unsettled and unsatisfactory
conditions which preceded its enactment.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The law of unfair competition, of which the law of trade-marks is a part,4 is
necessarily a flexible and expanding field. The need for effective protection against
unfair competition expands and diversifies as business itself expands and diversifies;
unfair trade tactics are limited only by the ingenuity of the unfair trader. Histori-
cally and necessarily, the courts have lagged in affording protection against unfair
trading, largely because they have had no official declarations of policy to guide them,
and standards of business behavior could be formulated only by trial and error after
the damage was done As one authority puts it,
Experience shows that by the time the judicial machinery arrives at a place where the
pirate was yesterday, ready to deal with him, that elusive person has moved forward and
is still a little ahead-at a place where the courts will not reach until tomorrow-and is
there engaged in doing something which will enable him to advantage himself at some-
one's else expense in some manner hitherto unthought of.6
* B.S. in E.E. 1929, Catholic University of America; LL.B. 1933, Georgetown University. Member of
the District of Columbia bar. Examiner, United States Patent Office, 1929-34; Special Assistant to the
Attorney General, 1941-46.
1 Act of July 5, 1946, 6o STAT. 427, 15 U. S. C. §1051 (1946).
' The term "unfair competition" is a misnomer since many acts not strictly competitive are actionable.
In HARRY D. NIMs, T-lE LAw oF UNFAIR CONPETI ION AND TRADE-MARKS (3d ed. 1936), seven pages
(16 to 22) are devoted to "Definitions of Unfair Competition," and in WALTER DERENBERO, TRADE-MAni
PROTEcTION AND UNFAIR TRADING (1936), the more accurate term "unfair trading" is used to describe
the cause of action. However, by widespread usage, the term "unfair competition" has acquired legal
standing, and will be used in this paper with the understanding that it includes acts and practices not
strictly competitive.
' July 5, 1947.
"Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U. S. 403, 413 (ig6); United Drug Co. v. Rectanus,
238 U. S. 90, 97 (1918).
'Handler, Unfair Competition, 21 IowA L. REv. 175, 179 (5936).
'Rogers, New Concepts of Unfair Competition under the Lanham Act, 38 T. M. Rep. 259, 270
(1948).
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The development of the substantive law of unfair competition has been primarily
by judicial decision. Both state and federal courts have afforded relief against unfair
competition.7 Vested trade-mark rights have been recognized and protected by the
courts of all states irrespective of state or federal registration, and, as might be
expected, the decisions of the different state and federal courts are not consistent or
uniform.8 As business grew and developed, this inconsistency and lack of uniformity
became disturbing to businessmen, so that when the first federal law relating to
trade-marks' was held unconstitutional,'0
Congress was flooded with proposed new legislation on the subject, even including a reso-
lution for an amendment to the Constitution of the United States granting to Congress
express power to regulate the use of trade-marks."
Most of the states have had laws providing for the registration of trade-marks' 2
and have afforded some protection for marks so registered," but state law is neces-
sarily ineffective to protect interstate business. Registration under state laws was not
essential even in so far as local business was concerned. The Association of the
Bar of the City of New York studied the matter of state registrations, and, as a result
of its study, issued a bulletin which contains the following statement:
Vested trade-mark rights are recognized and protected by the courts in all the states
irrespective of state or federal registration. Therefore the statement ... that state registra-
tion is necessary in order adequately to protect trade-mark rights is not true. State regis-
tration is helpful only in exceptional cases and the trade-mark owner should not be bur-
dened with the large expense involved in securing such registration except in unusual
cases.
14
Not only were the trade-mark registration laws of the states ineffective, but the
Committee on Patent, Trade Mark and Copyright Law of the American Bar Associ-
ation described most of such laws as "pernicious."'" Referring to certain trade-mark
registration laws pending in New York, Maryland, and Nevada, this committee
said that they "would provide work for lawyers and state registration specialists but
would be detrimental to trade-mark owners and to the public."'"
Even the common law of the states was uncertain and unsatisfactory, largely
because of the scarcity of precedents. Trade-mark and unfair competition cases
Handler, supra note 5, at 179.
R For a striking example of this divergence on substantially similar facts, ci. Putnam Nail Co. v.
Bennett, 43 Fed. 8oo (C. C. E. D. Pa. x89o), with Putnam Nail Co. v. Dulaney, 140 Pa. St. 2oJ, 21 Ad.
391 (1891).
' Act of July 8, x870, 16 STAT. x98.
"
0 Trade Mark Cases, xoo U. S. 82 (1879).
" Rep. No. 347 on H. R. 1656o, 5 8th Cong., 3d Sess. (1904), reprinted in 57 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y
1x20, 123 (1935).
12 17 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 120, 133 (1935).
a VALTER DERENBERG, PREPARING FOR THE Naw TRADE MARK LAw (Research Institute of America,
1946).
"4 Bulletin Regarding Circulars Recently Issued by Certain Sell-Styled "Trade Mark Specialists," re-
printed in 17 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 740, 741 (1935).
I1 1d. at 736.
10Id. at 737.
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were limited to the commercial centers and the decided cases were few and far from
comprehensive."
Because of pressure from business, Congress passed the Trade Mark Act of
19o5.8 * One of the major reasons urged for the passage of the bill was "that the
defects in existing law relating to such [interstate] use bf trade marks will be
remedied."'"
The Trade Mark Act of 19o5, however, fell far short of its objective of remedying
"the defects in existing law." The benefits of that Act were procedural only, and
the nature and scope of the right in a registered trade-mark remained a common-law
matter.2° The Trade Mark Act of 19o5 expressly preserved the common-law rights
in all trade-marks, whether registered or unregistered.'
The Act of 19o5 did give the federal courts jurisdiction in cases involving regis-
tered trade-marks, 22 and cases involving such marks were usually brought in the
federal courts. In addition, as businesses expanded from local to interstate and
international, many, if not most, of the cases involving unregistered trade-marks
and unfair competition found their way into the federal courts by reason of diversity
of citizenship.2 While the courts paid lip-service to the rule that substantive rights
in trade-marks rested upon the laws of the several states,24 nevertheless, because most
of the trade-mark and unfair competition cases were in the federal courts, a great
body of federal law was built up with no apparent regard for state precedents.
Practically, if not legalistically, there was a substantive federal common law of
trade-marks and unfair competition, and this body of federal decisions to some
extent provided a consistent and comprehensive guide for lawyers and businessmen.2
Continuous efforts by state legislatures to pass compulsory registration statutes
were feared and resented by businessmen2 and threatened to result in "an intolerable
"'Rogers, supra note 6, at 263.
1833 STAT. 724 (19o5), as amended, 52 STAT. 638 (1938), 15 U. S. C. §81 et seq. (1946).
17 J. PAT. OsF. Soc'y 133 (935).
"Estate of P. D. Beckwith v. Commissioner of Patents, 252 U. S. 538 (1920). "Registration of a
trade-mark under the Trade-Mark Act of x9o5 neither enlarges nor abridges the registrant's common-law
rights in the mark." Dwinell-Wright Co. v. National Fruit Product Co., 54 U. S. P. Q. 149, 151, 129 F.
2d 848, 85X (C. C. A. Ist 1942).
2133 STAT. 730 (1905), 15 U. S. C. §103 (1946).
2533 STAT. 728 (5905), as amended, 49 STAT. 1921 (936), Y5 U. S. C. §97 (1946).
"See note 17 supra.
"United Drug Co. v. Rectanus, 248 U. S. 90 (i918).
2"Zlinkoff, Erie v. Tompkins: In Relation to the Law of Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition, 32
T. M. REP. 81, 85 (r942), refers to the body of federal decisions as "an unusually large and important
body of jurisprudence." In Philco Corporation v. Phillips Mfg. Co., 133 F. 2d 663, 666 (C. C. A.
7th 1943), Judge Kerner said: "But in another sense there has been a federal general common law and
cases have been 'governed by federal law' within the meaning of the Erie doctrine, for federal courts
have exercised independent judgment as to what 'the common law' was in all cases in the field."
28 "Businessmen have a viewpoint different very often from the lawyer's viewpoint. We are
annoyed very much by State legislation and we are annoyed by picayunes who go out and try to scare
the manufacturers into registration under State laws with some reason which while it sounds plausible
at the time does not hold water." Testimony of W. H. Stanley, vice president, William Wrigley Jr. Co.,
in Hearings before the Subcommittee on Trade-Marks of the House Committee on Patents on H. R.
1o2, H. R. 5461, and S. 895, 7 7 th Cong., Ist Sess. 137, 138 (1941).
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mess, because we have 48 separate sovereignties to deal with, each legislating as it
sees fit with respect to marks within its borders regardless of where those marks
originate.""
There was no substantial question as to the general validity of state law in this
field, but at least until 1932 there was serious doubt as to the power of Congress to
enact substantive legislation relating to trade-marks and unfair competition."
Whether or not Congress had the power to enact such substantive legislation, there
was no doubt that it had refrained from doing so2 Trade-marks and unfair com-
petition are subjects over which the federal and state governments have concurrent
jurisdiction, and, since Congress had failed to act in substantive matters, state law
governed the substantive rights in these matters.
Beginning with the Trade-Mark Act of 188x,a" the efforts of Congress to legislate
with respect to trade-marks indicate a feeling of uncertainty as to its powers.
Congressional legislation treated procedure rather than substance, and, even pro-
cedurally, the legislation was piecemeal rather than comprehensive. As a result, the
federal statutory law of trade-marks was scattered through a number of statutes
31
and those statutes taken together were woefully inadequate 2 As early as 1928 the
need for codification and modification of the federal trade-mark laws was recognized
and made the subject of a study by the Committee on Patents, Trade Marks and
Copyrights of the American Bar AssociationY
3
The lack of uniformity in the trade-mark and unfair competition laws of the
different states and the inadequacy of federal law were highlighted when, in 1938,
the Supreme Court in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins'!, required the federal courts
to apply the law of the state in which they sit. In the first trade-mark case con-
sidered by the Supreme Court after the Erie decision, Kellogg Company v. National
.- "Most of the States were greedy for revenue, naturally enough, and here was an opportunity to
make the outsider pay revenue." Statement of Edward S. Rogers in Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Trade-Marks of the House Committee on Patents on H. R. 904z, 7 5 th Cong., 3 d Sess. ii, x2, 13 (1938)-
"
8 American Trading Co. v. Heacock Co., 285 U. S. 247 (1932).
2 See notes 2o and 21 supra.
o See note 9 supra.
15 U. S. C. §81-io9 (1946). "... We have had a number of Federal statutes. The first one
was the act of I87o. That was declared unconstitutional. It was followed by the act of 1881, which
applied to trade-marks used in foreign commerce and commerce with the Indian tribes, and was based
on the treaty-making power. That was supplemented or superseded, I should say, by the Act of 19o5,
which was based on the commerce clause and embraced trade-marks used in interstate commerce. That
was supplemented by the Act of 1920, and both acts have been amended from time to time. The result
is we now have a rather confused situation which is difficult to understand, because there are 9 or so
separate trade-mark acts and you find trade-mark provisions in such unexpected places as the Tariff Act,
the Act to Incorporate the Boy Scouts, and the Act to Incorporate the Red Cross, and it is hard for
anyone to find out what the Federal statutory law is, because it is so badly scattered." Statement of
Edward S. Rogers in Hearings, supra note 27, at 12.
" One of the most outstanding inadequacies is the failure of the Trade-Mark Act to recognize
secondary-meaning marks adopted after 1895 (so-called Ten Year proviso). 33 STAT. 725 (1905), as
amended, 43 STAT. 647 (1924), 15 U. S. C. §85 (1946).
"' See note 27 supra.
36304 U. S. 64 (938).
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Biscuit Company,3 the court specifically stated that the Erie doctrine applied in
trade-mark cases6
The effect of the Erie decision is well illustrated in the decisions of the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. In Sinko v. Snow-Craggs Corporation, 7 that
court based its decision upon the general principle that "equity will protect the
honest, and restrain the dishonest, trader,"38 basing its decision exclusively upon
decisions of the federal courts and one decision rendered by Mr. Justice Holmes
while on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Two years later this same
court decided Addressograph-Multigraph Corporation v. American Expansion Bolt
& Manufacturing Company?9  The complaint charged misappropriation of the
plaintiff's business system. The district court, relying on the Supreme Court's de-
cision in International News Service v. Associated Press, found all issues in favor
of plaintiff and -ordered an accounting of profits and damages. In reversing the
district court, the Court of Appeals said:
It appears that the lower court decided the case upon general Federal law. At any
rate, it is certain that the law of unfair competition, as announced by the courts of Illinois,
was not applied. We are therefore at the threshold of our consideration met with de-
fendant's contention that under Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins ...the law of the state, as
announced by its courts, must be given effect...
There is little room for argument but that the District Court, as well as this court,
must give application to the Illinois law of unfair competition....
. .. the law of unfair competition, as announced in Illinois, must be applied.40
The Court of Appeals found that under the law of Illinois, as announced by the
Illinois courts, actionable unfair competition was limited to "palming off" and that
therefore misappropriation of a business system was not actionable.
Recognition of the deficiencies in prior law was directly responsible for the pas-
sage of the Lanham Act. The report of the Senate Committee on Patents urged
passage of the Act in the following language:
The theory once prevailed that protection of trade-marks was entirely a State matter
and that the right to a mark was a common-law right. This theory was the basis of
previous national trade-mark statutes. Many years ago the Supreme Court held and has
recently repeated that there is no Federal common law. It is obvious that the States can
change the common law with respect to trade-marks and many of them have, with the
possible result that there may be as many different varieties of common law as there are
363o5 U. S. x1 (1938).
"Id., n. I. It is interesting to note, however, that in Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-
Enamel Corporation, 305 U. S. 315 (1938), which is in the same volume of the Reports, the Supreme
Court does not cite a single state decision nor refer to state law.
37 1o5 F. 2d 450 (C. C. A. 7 th i939). While this case was decided more than a year after Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, and eight months after the Erie doctrine was held applicable in trade-mark
and unfair competition cases in Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U. S. 111 (938), apparently
the court did not appreciate the application of the Erie doctrine and decided the case without reference
to Illinois law.
" Id. at 452.
124 F. 2d 706 (C. C. A. 7 th 1941), cert. denied, 316 U. S. 682 (1941).
Id. at 708.
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States. A man's rights in his trade-mark in one State may differ widely from the rights
which he enjoys in another.
However, trade is no longer local, but is national. Marks used in interstate com-
merce are properly the subject of Federal regulation. It would seem as if national legis-
lation along national lines securing to the owners of trade-marks in interstate commerce
definite rights should be enacted and should be enacted now.
There can be no doubt under the recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the consti-
tutionality of a national act giving substantive as distinguished from merely procedural
rights in trade-marks in commerce over which Congress has plenary power, and when it is
considered that the protection of trade-marks is merely protection to goodwill, to prevent
diversion of trade through misrepresentation, and the protection of the public against
deception, a sound public policy requires that trade-marks should receive nationally the
greatest protection that can be given them.4'
This statement, especially the reference to the need for "national legislation along
national lines," shows a clear recognition of the fact that in the field of trade-marks
and unfair competition uniformity is essential to protect and preserve commerce.
The power of Congress to regulate interstate and foreign commerce is clear,42
and doubt as to the power of Congress to regulate trade-marks and unfair competi-
tion could only be based upon doubt as to whether these subjects are within the
commerce power. Whatever may have been the legal concept of commerce at the
time of the Heacock decision,4 this concept has been considerably broadened since
1933. As stated by Mr. Justice Rutledge,
44
The aegis of federal commerce power continued to spread over and enfold other business
so conducted, in both general and specific legislative exertions. Usually this was with
judicial approval; and, despite notable instances of initial hostility, the history of judicial
limitation of congressional power over commerce, when exercised affirmatively, has been
more largely one of retreat than of ultimate victory.
The courts have recognized and sustained the power of Congress to regulate
competitive practices under the Federal Trade Commission Act,4 0 and "unfair
methods of competition"46 under that Act include a variety of trade-mark situa-
tions 7 Trade-marks have been identified as the symbols "we purchase goods by, '
4
,;SEN. RaP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).
"U. S. CoNsr. Art. I, §8.
"See note 28 supra.
"Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408, 415 (1946).
' 38 STAT. 717 (1914), as amended, 52 STAT. 111 (1938), 15 U. S. C. §41 (1946).
"38 STAT. 79 (1914), as amended, 52 STAr. io28 (1938), 15 U. S. C. §45 (1946).
"'Handler, Unfair Competition, 21 IowA L. REv. 175 (1936), lists a number of trade-mark or
closely related practices which the Federal Trade Commission has'banned or attempted to ban as "unfair
methods of competition." Some of the more important are "false or misleading advertising," "mis-
branding," "passing off," "use of misleading trade names," and "giving products misleading names."
Id. at 244, 245, 247. The practices which the courts have condemned include "false advertising and
misbranding," "misrepresentation of business status," "misrepresentation of origin," "simulation of
trade marks and trade names." Id. at 248, 249. Handler does state, however, "It is rather doubtful
whether orders forbidding trade mark and trade name simulation, except where the mark or name is
inherently deceptive, will be sustained." Id. at 25o. This doubt apparently springs from the fact that
the Commission functions to protect the public generally and that ordinary trade-mark infringement
is a private wrong for which adequate remedies are provided. See Derenberg, The Patent Office As
Guardian of the Public Interest in Trade-Mark Registration Proceedings, infra.
" Mishawaka Rubber and Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co., 36 U. S. 203, 205 (1942).
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and press and radio are constant reminders of the intimate and inseparable relation-
ship between the symbols and the trade itself. In Wickard v. Filburn4" the Supreme
Court upheld the power of Congress to penalize the threshing of 239 bushels of
wheat for home use because of the "effect on interstate commerce."5'  It seems
obvious that the integrity of trade-marks such as "Gold Medal"'" has a far greater
effect on interstate commerce and more immediately and directly affects the wheat-
purchasing public than Filburn's 239 bushels of wheat. Thus, if it is within the
power of Congress to regulate the latter, the former is also within that power.
With the defects and uncertainties of prior law and the need for uniform federal
law in mind, Congress clearly and specifically stated the intent of the Lanham Act
in the following language:
The intent of this Act is to regulate commerce within the control of Congress by
making actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks in such commerce; to pro-
tect registered marks used in such commerce from interference by State, or territorial
legislation; to protect persons engaged in such commerce against unfair competition; to
prevent fraud and deception in such commerce by the use of reproductions, copies,
counterfeits, or colorable imitations of registered marks; and to provide rights and reme-
dies stipulated by treaties and conventions respecting trade-marks, trade names and unfair
competition entered into between the United States and foreign nations.5 5
It was thus the intent of Congress in the Lanham Act to deal with "registered
marks,' '53 "marks'"" which are entitled to registration, "trade-marks" ' which may
or may not be entitled to registration, "trade names,""0 and "unfair competition."
Registered marks are to be protected "from interference by State, or territorial legis-
lation," deceptive and misleading use of marks in commerce is to be made "action-
able," "rights and remedies" are to be provided respecting trade-marks, trade names
and unfair competition, and persons engaged in commerce are entitled to effective
protection against unfair competition5 7
Other sections of the Act corroborate and emphasize the breadth of the Lanham
Act. Congress makes the Act applicable to "all commerce which may lawfully be
"137 U. S. "1 (942).
goId. at 125.
"France Milling Co. v. Washburn Crosby Co., 7 F. 2d 304 (C. C. A. 2d 1925).
" 60 STAT. 443, 15 u. S. C. §5xr27 (1946).
1 The term "registered mark" means a mark registered in the United States Patent Office under this
Act or under the Act of March 3, s88i, or the Act of February 2o, i9o5, or the Act of March 19, 1920.
The phrase "marks registered in the Patent Office" means registered marks. See note 52 supra.
" The term "mark" includes any trade-mark, service mark, collective mark, or certification mark
entitled to registration under this Act whether registered or not. See note 52 supra.
"The term "trade-mark" includes any word, name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof
adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods and distinguish them from those
manufactured or sold by others. See note 52 supra.
"'The terms "trade name" and "commercial name" include individual names and surnames, firm
names and trade names used by manufacturers, industrialists, merchants, agriculturists, and others to iden-
tify their businesses, vocations, or occupations; the names or titles lawfully adopted and used by persons,
firms, associations, corporations, companies, unions, and any manufacturing, industrial, commercial agricul.
rural, or other organizations engaged in trade or commerce and capable of suing and being sued in a court
of law. See note 52 supra.
17 6o STrA. 443, 15 U. S. C. §5127 (1946).
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regulated by Congress," throughout all territory which is under the jurisdiction and
control of the United States. 5 These broad statements show clearly and unmis-
takably that in the Lanham Act Congress intended to exercise its full power to
regulate trade-marks and unfair competition to the end that the law in this field
might be certain and uniform throughout the United States. The Lanham Act is
"national legislation along national lines."
While the Lanham Act will necessarily affect the whole field of trade-mark and
unfair competition law, only a few of the more important effects and changes can
be considered in this paper. These more important effects are: (i) The effect on
the jurisdiction of the federal courts; (2) the effect on the rules of decision for the
federal courts; (3) the effect on state statutes relating to trade-marks or unfair com-
petition; (4) the effect on rules of decision in state courts; and (5) the protection of
rights existing at the time the Lanham Act became effective.
II '
JURISDICTION OF Tim FEDERAL COURTS
The jurisdiction of the federal courts in cases involving infringement of registered
trade-marks presents no serious question. The federal courts had such jurisdiction
under the Trade-Mark Act of I9o5," and such jurisdiction is continued under the
Lanham Act.60 This jurisdiction attaches "without regard to the amount in contro-
versy or to diversity or lack of diversity of the citizenship of the parties."'"
Jurisdiction involving unregistered trade-marks or trade names or unfair compe-
tion is, however, not so clear in the absence of diversity of citizenship of the parties
and the requisite amount in controversy. It is certain that the existence of a question
relating to trade-marks, trade names, or unfair competition did not constitute an
independent ground for federal jurisdiction prior to the Lanham Act,92 and the
question is whether the Lanham Act has changed the law in this respect.
Section 39 of the Lanham Act confers jurisdiction on the federal courts of- "all
actions arising under this Act, without regard to the amount in controversy or to
diversity or lack of diversity of the citizenship of the parties."'  Thus federal
jurisdiction depends on whether the action "arises under" the Lanham Act and not
on whether the plaintiff's mark is registered.
Section 44 (h) provides that certain foreign nationals "shall be entitled to effective
protection against unfair competition, and the remedies provided herein for infringe-
ts Ibid.
60 33 STAT. 728 (905), as amended, 49 STAT. 192I (1936), X5 U. S. C. §97 (1946); 36 STAT. 1092
(1911), 28 U. S. C. §41(7) (946).
° 6 o STAT. 440, 15 U. S. C. § 121 (1946).
lbid. The Federal judicial Code, effective September z, 1948, also contains a further expression
of the Congressional intent to broaden the jurisdiction of the federal courts in trade-mark and unfair
competition matters. 28 U. S. C. §I338(b).
' Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U. S. 315 (1938).
" See note 6o supra.
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ment of marks shall be available so far as they may be appropriate in repressing acts
of unfair competition." 4 Section 44(g) provides that "trade names or commercial
narqes" of such foreign nationals "shall be protected without the obligation of filing
or registration whether or not they form parts of marks." ' Section 44(i) extends
the benefits of Sections 44(g) and (h) to citizens or residents of the United States. 6
It seems clear, therefore, that cases involving "effective protection against unfair
competition," which would include all trade-mark and trade name cases, and cases
involving protection of trade names or commercial names would be actions "arising
under" the Lanham Act and would therefore be within the jurisdiction of the federal
courts under Section 39.
Not only do the words of Sections 39 and 44(g), (h) and (i) require this con-
struction, but any other construction would do violence to the intent of Congress
stated in Section 45. Section 45 states that Congress intended to make "actionable
the deceptive and misleading use of marks in . ..commerce; to protect persons
engaged in ... commerce against unfair competition; ... and to provide rights and
remedies ... respecting trade-marks, trade names and unfair competition.... "" The
only place in which such conduct is made actionable and such protection, rights, and
remedies are afforded in the case of unfair competition not involving registered
marks is in Section 44, so that Congress must have intended that such cases should
be actions arising under the Lanham Act and within the jurisdiction of the federal
courts under Section 39-
The only test of the jurisdiction of the federal courts is whether an action involves
"commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress," since otherwise the action
would not be one "arising under" the Lanham Act within the meaning of Section
39. The existence of federal jurisdiction thus depends upon whether the conduct
involved or the parties to the cause of action are within or subject to the regulatory
04 6o STAT. 44', 15 U. S. C. §1126(h) (1946). "Persons who are nationals of, domiciled in, or
have a bona fide and effective business or commercial establishment in any foreign country, which is a
party to (i) the International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, signed at Paris on
March 20, 1883; or (:z) the General Inter-American Convention for Trade-Mark and Commercial
Protection signed at Washington on February 20, 1929; or (3) any other convention or treaty relating
to trade-marks, trade or commercial names, or the repression of unfair competition to which the United
States is a party, shall be entitled to the benefits and subject to the provisions of this chapter to the
extent and under the conditions essential to give effect to any such conventions and treaties so long as the
United States shall continue to be a party thereto, except as provided in the following paragraphs of this
section." 6o STAT. 441, 15 U. S. C. §xx26(b) (1946).
"
5 6o STAT. 44!, 15 UT. S. C. §xx26(g) (1946).
o "Citizens or residents of the United States shall have the same benefits as are granted by this
7 .ons d:scribed in paragraph (b) hereof." 6o STAT. 441, 15 U. S. C. §u126(i) (1946).
'76o STAT. 443, 15 U. S. C. §1127 (1946). In this last quotation reference to treaties and con-
ventions is omitted, as such reference is descriptive rather than limiting. Section 44 of the Lanham
Act specifies the "rights and remedies" under such treaties and conventions and then in Section 44(0)
extends such rights and remedies to citizens and residents of the United States. The treaties and con-
ventions are concerned only with the "rights and remedies" afforded citizens or residents of foreign
countries, not the "rights and remedies" which the United States affords its own citizens or residents.
The statement of intent is in better accord with the facts if the reference to treaties and conventions is
construed as descriptive of the type of "rights and remedies" granted rather than as limiting the persons
entitled to such "rights and remedies:
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power of Congress, and hence involves consideration of the scope of the commerce
power
8
While the Lanham Act broadens the jurisdiction of the federal courts, nothing
in the Act makes that jurisdiction exclusive even where registered marks are in-
volved. The Lanham Act thus extends the jurisdiction of the federal courts without
limiting the jurisdiction of state courts. However, for reasons which will later
appear, this extension of federal jursidiction will probably result in the federal
courts' becoming the only important forum in unfair competition matters.
III
RULES OF DECISION IN FEDERAL COURTS
After the Erie decision it was clear that trade-mark and unfair competition cases
which did not involve trade-marks registered under federal statutes were governed
by state law 9 In cases involving registered trade-marks, federal law governed pro-
cedure and remedies,7" but there was a serious and difficult question whether the
"substantive rights" of the parties were determined by federal or state law. 1'
As between state and federal law, the better rule was that announced by the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, "that on the question of infringement of
registered trade-marks the applicable law is federal statutory law, and where that
is ambiguous or silent, federal case law . . ." But application of this rule was not
without difficulty. In the Seventh Circuit, federal law was held to apply only in sit-
uations involving "'passing off' effected solely by the use of a trade-mark" 3 ; and
even then federal law was not applicable "if either party's mark is used only in
intrastate commerce, or if both marks are unregistered . . . under the Act.' 7 4 In a
suit for infringement of a registered trade-mark, the substantive rights of the owner
of the mark could thus depend upon the extent and character of the defendant's
activities rather than upon any absolute rights resulting from ownership of the
registered mark.
Many, if not most, suits for infringement of a registered trade-mark include a
count or claim for unfair competition. Ordinarily, in such an action the infringement
count would be governed to some extent by federal law, and the unfair competition
count would be governed exclusively by state law.75 However, at least one court
"s For a discussion of the commerce power in connection with the Lanham Act, see March, Terri-
torial Scope of the Trade Mark Act of r946, 38 T. M. Rep. 955, 965 (1948).
" Philco Corporation v. Phillips Mfg. Co., 133 F. 2d 663, 667 (C. C. A. 7 th 1943).
"o Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U. S. 315, 333 (1938).
"' Dwinell-Wright Co. v. National Fruit Product Co., 14o F. ad 618, 62o (C. C. A. Ist 1944); but
see Folmr Graflex Corporation v. Graphic Photo Service, 44 F. Supp. 429, 432 (D. Mass. 1942). See
criticism of the Folmer Graflex case in Zlinkoff, Erie v. Tompkins: In Relation to the Law of Trade-Marks
and Unfair Competition, 32 T. M. Rep. 81, ro (1942).
" Dwinell-Wright Co. v. National Fruit Product Co., supra note 7r, at 620.
a Philco Corporation v. Phillips Mfg. Co., supra note 69, at 672.
"Id. at 670.
Note 69 supra. The difficulties inherent in the application of laws of different sovereignties in the
same case have been to some extent relieved by the fact that in some states the federal and state laws
are identical. Gamlen Chemical Co. v. Gamlen, 38 T. M. Rep. 876 (W. D. Pa. 1948). But see note 8
supra.
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has held that an unfair competition count is also governed by federal law if juris-
diction of the count is ancillary to jurisdiction of a count for infringement of a
registered mark, but is governed by state law if jurisdiction of the unfair competi-
tion count is based on diversity.76
This confusion, uncertainty, and conflict results from the effort to apply the
Rules of Decision Act 77 as interpreted in the Eric decision to the law of trade-marks
and unfair competition. Because so much of present-day business is national in
scope, the law of trade-marks and unfair competition does not lend itself to treat-
ment on a local scale. The Lanham Act brings the whole field of trade-marks and
unfair competition, with certain minor exceptions, into the exception in the Rules of
Decision Act, and frees trade-mark and unfair competition actions from state law.
The Lanham Act, in effect, eliminates the difficulties and uncertainties which re-
sulted from application of the Erie doctrine in trade-mark and unfair competition
cases.
The Rules of Decision Act provides that state law is to be applied in the federal
courts, "except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States
otherwise require or provide. .."' and the Lanham Act both requires and pro-
vides that the federal courts exercise their independent judgement in trade-mark and
unfair competition matters.
By its 'terms, the Lanham Act covers the whole field of unfair competition, in-
cluding infringement of trade-marks and trade names and other forms of unfair
competition. Both the terms and the legislative history of the Act show that Con-
gress intended that the law of unfair competition7" should be uniform throughout
the United States. 0 In the Philco case8' the court, discussing the Acts of 19o5 and
i92o, said: "The intention of Congress was to achieve uniformity within the area occu-
pied. In so far as State law conflicts with this policy of the Trade Mark Acts, it must
yield to the superior federal law." In the Lanham Act, Congress occupies the whole
area of unfair competition, thus leaving little or nothing to the operation of state
law, whether decisional or statutory SA
In addition to the fact that the congressional intent was to occupy the entire
field, it should be noted that the protection to be afforded against unfair competi-
tion is a matter of interpretation and application of the Lanham Act and is there-
fore a matter in which the federal courts must exercise independent judgment, un-
70 Bulova Watch Co. v. Stolzberg, 69 F. Supp. 543, 546 (D. Mass. 1947).
77 REV. ST'r. §72- (1875), 28 U. S. C. §72.5 (1946).
'18 Ibid.
'" The courts have held that federal law governs in cases involving tradc-marks registered under
the Acts of 1905 and ig2o. See notes 69, 70, and 71 supra. In this discussion, the effects of the
Lanham Act on the rules of decision in unfair competition cases will be considered since the changes
made with respect to unfair competition generally are more clearly applicable to cases involving registered
marks.
"0 See, for example, SEN. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).8 1 Philco Corporation v. Phillips Mfg Co., 33 F. 2d 663, 672 (C. C. A. 7th 943).
'82State law continues to govern purely local matters, bur, as will be pointed out later, local matters
which do not affect commerce may be so few as to be inconsequential.
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hampered by the statutes or decisions of the state in which the federal court sitsO 3
Cases involving registered trade-marks are specifically freed "from interference by
State, or territorial legislation." 4
The Lanham Act provides that trade names "shall be protected" 5 and that
"effective protection"8 6 shall be afforded against unfair competition. While it is
true that the Act does not define "unfair competition," it is for the federal courts
to find and decide the meaning of the term. It is for the federal courts to decide
what acts constitute the "unfair competition" which the Lanham Act makes "action-
able" and against which it provides "effective protection." Application of the laws
of the particular state in which a federal court sits would do violence to the con-
gressional intent to provide "national legislation along national lines." Thus the
federal courts sitting in Illinois, for example, will not be limited to the Illinois
"palming off" doctrine" but will be bound by the broader federal interpretation of
"unfair competition."8 8
Not only does the Lanham Act require the federal courts to apply their own
interpretation of the term "unfair competition," but the relief to be afforded is also
a question of federal law. The Act provides that "the remedies provided herein for
infringement of marks shall be available . . . in repressing acts of unfair competi-
tion."' 9  These remedies include "injunctions, according to the principles of equity
... to prevent the violation of any right," 0 and it is specifically provided that pro-
tection against unfair competition shall be "effective."' The determination of
the right, the need for protection, and the granting of effective relief are matters of
interpretation and application of a federal statute, and are wholly independent of
state law. 2
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated in the Philco case that
"The policy of a statute which Congress has enacted under its constitutional power
to regulate interstate commerce may not be defeated or obstructed by State law,
whether decisional ... or statutory .. ."9z but held that application of the Acts of
19o5 and 192o was limited to "that part of the field of unfair competition... having
to do with 'passing off' effected solely by the use of a trade mark." 94 Whether or
not the court was correct in its view of the scope of the Acts of 19o5 and i92o, it was
Js erome v. United States, 38 U. S. soi (943).
8,6o STAT. 443, 115 U. S. C. §s127 (1946).
"
8 6o STAr. 441, 15 U. S. C. §I26(g) (946).
8" 6o STAP. 44r, 5 U. S. C. §I26(h) (1946).
8'Time, Inc. v. Viobin Corporation, 128 F. 2d 86o (C. C. A. 7th 1942).
8 For example, International News Service v. The Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215, 236 (s918),
identifies the right to protection against unfair competition as the right to protection in the conduct of a
lawful business.
"See note 64 sUPtra.
8060 STAr. 439, 15 U. S. C. §is6 (1946).
81 See note 86 supra.
2 7n re Pittsburgh Railways, Co., 155 F. 2d 477 (C. C. A. 3d 1946), cert. denied, 329 U. S. 731
(1916).
8 5 Philco Corporation v. Phillips Mfg. Co., supra note 69, at 671-672.
S'Id. at 672.
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correct in its holding as to the effect of congressional action upon state law. The
Lanham Act, however, covers the whole field of unfair competition, so that federal
law is supreme in the field.
The extent to which particular acts or transactions will be subject to the Lanham
Act-and hence the extent to which federal law governs-depends upon the scope
given by the courts to the power of Congress over commerce. Where both parties
to an unfair competition action are engaged in interstate or foreign commerce and
the unfair competitive acts occur in that commerce, there is no difficulty in finding the
Lanham Act applicable. The difficulty arises when at least one of the parties is
engaged in a local business or the unfair acts are local. Prior to the Lanham Act,
unfair competition cases reached the federal courts on diversity grounds"' and were
subject to the vicissitudes of state law. Even federal registrations did not constitute
a basis for relief against purely intrastate infringement. °6
The commerce to which Congress made the Lanham Act applicable is "all com-
merce which may be lawfully regulated by Congress,"' 7 and the power of Congress
to regulate competitive practices extends to matters which are wholly intrastate if
they affect interstate commerce. 8  The Lanham Act therefore applies whenever
interstate or foreign commerce is affected, regardless of whether the business of one
or both parties or the unfair acts are strictly local. In the Filburn case, the power
of Congress was held to include control over wheat intended for consumption on
the very farm where it was grown; a similar construction applied to the Lanham
Act would make that Act applicable in almost every conceivable situation.
Since unfair competition is a violation of the right to conduct a lawful business,100
it necessarily affects every part of the business. For example, in the simplest form
of unfair competition-passing off-the deception not only affects the business
which is directly injured but also necessarily affects both the customers and suppliers
of that business. To the extent that such customers or suppliers are engaged in
interstate or foreign commerce, such commerce will be affected regardless of the
character of the business against which the unfair competition is immediately di-
rected.
So far as the federal courts are concerned, there will probably be few, if any,
situations in which state law will be applied in an unfair competition case. Juris-
diction will ordinarily be based upon the Lanham Act itself or upon diversity of
citizenship. If jurisdiction is based upon the Lanham Act, that Act will apply;
while if a citizen of one state is competing unfairly with a citizen of another, com-
" Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., supra note 70.
" See March, supra note 68, at 962.
97 6o STAr. 443, 15 U. S. C. §I127 (946).
"'in United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 3X5 U. S. 110, 120 (1942), Chief Justice Stone said:
. the marketing of a local product in competition with that of a like commodity moving interstate
may so interfere with interstate commerce or its regulation as to afford a basis for Congressional regula-
tion of the intrastate activity. It is the effect upon the interstate commerce or its regulation, regardless
of the particular form which the competition may take, which is the test of federal power."
59 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. x1 (1942).
10 See note 88 supra.
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merce within the regulatory power of Congress will almost invariably be involved.
It is theoretically possible that a case of purely local unfair competition could be
ancillary to a cause of action within the jurisdiction of the federal courts and there-
fore be triable in the federal courts, but such cases will probably be few 11
IV
STATE LAws
The Lanham Act not only eliminates the effects of the Erie decision in the
federal courts, but makes state law wholly ineffective in all cases of unfair compe-
tition in commerce subject to the power of Congress. While it is true that "as a
matter of statutory construction Congressional intention to displace local laws in the
exercise of the commerce power is not, in general, to be inferred unless clearly indi-
cated by those considerations which are persuasive of the statutory purpose,"' 5 the
statutory purpose of the Lanham Act to displace local laws is clear. So far as
registered marks are concerned, that purpose is expressly stated.1
0 3
In cases of unfair competition generally, the congressional purpose was to provide
uniformity in place of conflict and confusion.' 4 The commerce clause of the
Constitution'0 5 is not only a grant of power to Congress but is a limitation on the
power of the states, 0 6 and state laws cannot interfere "in matters with respect to
which uniformity of regulation is of predominant national concern."'0 7 Where the
policy of Congress is to provide uniform regulation for the entire field of unfair
competition, state law, whether coinciding with or opposing the federal law, is in-
effective'0 8 even in those situations which are subject to the regulatory power of
Congress but are not specifically regulatedY
The state laws most obviously affected by the Lanham Act are the trade-mark
registration statutes of the various states. These registration statutes have never
been mandatory," 0 and, since the Lanham Act became effective, it is extremely
doubtful that state registration laws could be made mandatory as against marks
used in commerce within the regulatory power of Congress. Certainly no state
... Musher Foundation, Inc. v. Alba Trading Co., 127 F. 2d 9 (C. C. A. 2d 1942), cert. denied, 3r7
U. S. 641 (1942); Zalkind v. Scheinman, x39 F. 2d 895 (C. C. A. 2d 1943), celt. denied, 322 U. S.
738 (1943). But see 28 U. S. C. §1338(b).
102 Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U. S. 598, 614 (1940).
... 6o STAT. 443, 15 U. S. C. §1127 (1946).
10' The confusion and conflict in the unfair competition laws of the various states was one of the
principal grounds urged in support of a federal law of trade-marks and unfair competition (see note
27 supra) and the need for uniform legislation was one of the prinicpal reasons urged for passage of
the Lanham Act. (See note 41 supra.) There is certainly no indication that Congress intended that
state law should continue to be applicable, and, in the absence of such an indication, a Congressional
intent that the Lanham Act shall apply uniformly is to be implied. Jerome v. United States, 318 U. S.
10r (1943). See also Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U. S. 363 (943).1 05U. S. CoNs-r. Art. I, §8.
... Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 252 (1946).
.0. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U. S. 761, 700 0945).
"'Charleston & V. C. Ry. v. Varnville Furniture Co. 237 U. S. 597 (915).
... Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York Labor Relations Board, 330 U. S. 767 (1947).
110 17 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 120, 133 (1935).
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couldrequire registration of a "registered mark" as defined in the Lanham Act,l t
because the Act expressly frees such marks from interference by state or territorial
legislation."' Marks which are not "registered marks" but which are used in
commerce subject to the control of Congress, while not exempted from state laws
by specific provision, are exempt from interference from such laws by necessary
implication. Compulsory state registration would place a burden on users of such
marks;"13 and no state can lawfully impose such a barrier against, or impose such
a burden on, interstate or foreign commerce' 14
A state may provide for registration of trade-marks used in the state, and may
also specify the rights of the registrant and remedies for infringement. However,
even before the passage of the Lanham Act, state registrations were of doubtful
value against interstate users."' The Lanham Act protects and preserves trade-
mark rights existing prior to its effective date," 6 but after that date the effectiveness
of a local trade-mark against an interstate user will probably be governed by the
Lanham Act.
The definition of "trade names" in the Lanham Act" 7 is broad enough to include
corporate names. Corporate names are a matter of state corporation law, but in so
far as use of a corporate name affects or is affected by a trade-mark or trade name in
commerce within the meaning of the Lanham Act, the provisions of the Lanham
Act will control. The Lanham Act, by affording protection for trade names, 118
protects corporate names, and prior users of trade names or trade-marks are protected
against subsequently adopted similar corporate names on several grounds.
In the first place, the common law afforded protection against corporate names
which might cause confusion or mistake or deceive purchasers." 9 In addition, the
Lanham Act provides that trade names shall be protected, and federal power to
enjoin use of particular corporate names as competitive devices has been clearly
established. 2 '. As stated by Mr. Justice Murphy, the Federal Government
. . . may compel changes in the voting rights and other privileges of stockholders. It
may order divestment or rearrangement of property, it may order the reorganization or
dissolution of a corporation. In short, Congress is completely uninhibited by the com-
merce clause in selecting the means considered necessary for bringing about the desired
conditions in the channels of interstate commerce. l'2
... See notes 53 and 55 supra.
112 See note 86 supra.
... See notes 24 and 25 supra.
"' Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U. S. 416 (1946). See also Coca-Cola Co. v. State, 225 S. W. 791
(Tex. Civ. App. i92o).
" Coca-Cola Co. v. Stevenson, 276 Fed. roio (D. C. III. 1920). See also Gibbons v. Ogden, 9
Wheat. I (U. S. x824).
1186o STAT. 427, 15 U. S. C. note following §1051 (1946).
"7 See note 56 supra.
118 See note 65 supra.
11 9 CHARLES BuRKE ELLiorr, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 43, 44, 45 (1923).
120 Federal Trade Commission v. Pure Silk Hosiery Mill, 3 F. 2d 105 (C. C. A. 7th 1924).
... American Power & Light Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 329 U. S. 90, 99 (1946).
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If the power of Congress extends to reorganization or dissolution of a corporation
created by the state, a fortiori it extends to protecting or enjoining the use of a
particular corporate name.
Prior to passage of the Lanham Act, there was nothing to detract from the juris-
diction of state courts over actions involving trade-marks or unfair competition, 22
and the Lanham Act makes no change in this regard. However, the Lanham Act
and decisions of the federal courts construing it will be binding upon state courts
in cases involving unfair competition within the scope of the Act. For example, a
state court will be obliged to give to a certificate of registration the evidentiary
value provided in the Lanham Act,'23 and to afford against unfair competition re-
lief which would be "effective" in accordance with the decisions of the federal
courts.
124
The extent of this change is in some instances radical and striking. Instead of
the federal courts sitting in Illinois being bound by the obsolete Illinois rule that
"passing off" is the only actionable form of unfair competition, 26 the courts of
Illinois will be obliged to apply the more modern, more flexible federal rule that
interference with the right to conduct a lawful business is actionable.
26
Even in cases which are wholly local, 'the probability is that state courts will
apply the law of unfair competition as it is applied in the federal courts. State
courts are obliged to apply that law in cases involving citizens of other states, and
to deny their own citizens the same rights would be a discrimination in favor of
outsiders. Such rulings would be at once unfair, unrealistic, and impolitic.
V
PESERVATION OF EXISTING RIGHTS
Prior to the effective date of the Lanham Act, common-law trade-mark rights
were, in the absence of conflicting rights of others, coextensive with the use made
of the mark. The Act of 19o5 preserved common-law rights whether existing
at the time of the Act or acquired thereafter.'7 Not infrequently, different persons
owned identical marks for identical goods in different parts of the United States,' 28
and it is probable that there are many marks which are used-and therefore owned
-for marketing areas confined to one or a few states. Such trade-mark rights,
however limited geographically or otherwise, are none the less property rights'
2
'
entitled to recognition and protection.
"2' There is nothing in the federal law of trade-marks comparable to the law relating to patents. See
28 U. S. C. §371.
12 60 STAT. 438, 15 U. S. C. §IIX5 (1946).
"' U. S. Coqsrr. Art. VI.
2 2
'See notes 37 and 87 sapra.
1 8 See note 9 supra.
12733 STAT. 730 (9o5), 15 U. S. C. §103 (1946).
12 Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U. S. 403, 413 (2926); United Drug Co. v. Rectanus,
238 U. S. 90, 97 (1918).,
2' Hanover Star Milling Co. v, Metcalf, supra.
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The Lanham Act provides that "Registration of a mark on the principal register
provided by this Act or under the Act of March 3, 188i, or the Act of February 20,
19o5, shall be constructive notice of the registrant's claim of ownership."' 0  Such
registration is evidence of the "registrant's exclusive right to use the registered
mark"'' in "all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress.' ' 2
Thus the Act gives a registrant at least pre-emptive trade-mark protection throughout
the United States=3 and makes the registration notice of that fact. For this reason
it is substantially impossible, since the effective date of the Lanham Act, to acquire
local rights in conflict with a registered mark, even in an area not yet invaded by the
registrant. 4
There is no constitutional difficulty in legislation which prevents future con-
flicting local trade-mark rights; but in providing national legislation Congress
could not constitutionally destroy existing trade-mark rights.'3 5 To avoid this con-
stitutional difficulty, the Act preserves pre-existing trade-mark rights by providing
that "Nothing herein shall adversely affect the right or the enforcement of rights
in marks acquired in good faith prior to the effective date of this Act."1  In
addition to this general preservation of trade-mark rights, the Act offers specific
benefits and protection for certain types of pre-existing rights' and protects such
rights from the effects of even incontestable registrations' 8
Where different persons had rights in identical marks for identical goods in
different parts of the United States, the rights of each such person in its own mark
were coextensive with the territory in which the mark was used; but only the first
user could register under the Act of I9o5.' Even when a mark was registered
under the Act of 19o5, a subsequent user could, by use of a mark identical with a
registered mark, obtain rights in such mark in territory in which the registrant had
not used his mark. 40
In maintaining the exclusive features of pre-existing trade-mark rights, the Lan-
ham Act preserves the common-law rights of trade-mark owners against infringe-
136 6o STAr. 435, 15 U. S. C. S1072 (1946).
... 6o STAT. 438, x5 U. S. C. §ixi5 (1946). The certificate of registration is prima facie evidence
of this right if the mark is not incontestable. 6o STAT. 438, x5 U. S. C. Sxixs(b) (1946).
... 6o STAT. 443, 15 U. S. C. §1127 (1946).
"'a March, supra note 69, at 957.
' The right to continue to use such a local mark could be secured by laches or estoppel, since
Section 34 provides for the granting of injunctions "according to the principles of equity." However,
such a local use could not support even concurrent registration since a concurrent registration of a mark
must be based upon "concurrent lawful use thereof in commerce prior to any of the filing dates of the
applications involved." Sec. 2(d).
15 1 U. S. CoNsr. AdEND. V.
ias 6o STAr. 427, 15 U. S. C. note following §io5i (1946).
""'Concurrent registrations. 6o SrAT. 428, 15 U. S. C. §1052(d) (1946).
... 6o STAT. 438, 15 U. S. C. §iiz5(b) (5) (1946). The wording of this section is not entirely clear.
See Diggins, The Lanham Trade-Mark Xct, 37 T. M. Rep. 36 (1947). But the ambiguity should present
no particular difficulty when construed in the light of Sec. 49. See also Sec. 33 (b)(6), 6o STAT. 438,
z5 U. S. C. §Ix 5 (b)(6) (1946).
"'
0 Act of 1905, 33 STAT. 725 (1905), as amended, 43 SrAT. 647 (1924), 15 U. S. C. 585 (1946).
1"' United States Printing and Lithographing Co. v. Griggs, Cooper & Co., 279 U. S. 156 (1929).
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ment. Even registered marks which are otherwise incontestable may infringe "a
valid right acquired under the law of any State or territory,"'' and if a registered
mark which is otherwise incontestable may infringe such a right, a fortiori a mark
which is not incontestable might also infringe. In such a situation, the acquisition
and validity of the right, since its existence depends upon state or territorial law,
would necessarily be determined in accordance with that law. The issue of in-
fringement however, involves interpretation of the Lanham Act since determination
of the "extent" of infringement determines the extent of incontestability.142
The Lanham Act affords additional protection for existing common-law rights
by providing that where limited marks have been used concurrently, both may be
registered so long as each is limited to its previous use.'43 Such concurrent registra-
tions may be granted only when continued use of the marks is unlikely to cause
confusion, mistake, or deceit of purchasers, and the registrations must contain
"conditions and limitations" necessary to maintain such distinctions.' 44 The evi-
dentiary effect of such concurrent registrations is limited by such "conditions and
limitations,"'145 and presumably the constructive notice effect' 46 is similarly limited.
Concurrent-use registrations under the Lanham Act in effect preserve the ex-
clusive features of certain pre-existing trade mark rights; but in addition, the Act
provides for continuation of pre-existing rights to use marks. The exclusionary
right is somewhat limited, but the defensive right as against registered marks which
have not become incontestable is quite broad. Against registered marks which are
not incontestable an infringer may rely upon "any legal or equitable defense or
defect which might have been asserted if such mark had not been registered.' 47
The Act does not specify what constitutes a "legal or equitable defense or defect,"
but the determination whether particular facts constitute a "defense or defect" within
... Sec. 1s, 6o STAT. 433, 15 U. S. C. §1165 (1946).
"'2 To leave the issue of infringement of state or territorial marks to state or territorial law would
destroy the uniformity which the Lanham Act seeks. For example, there could be trade-mark rights
in two states antedating the registered mark. If one of the two states follows a strict "passing off"
theory of infringement and the other follows the "dilution" theory (Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Productions,
Inc., 262 N. Y. 482, 188 N. E. 8o (1932)), a registered mark might "infringe" to a different extent in
each state and hence, under §z5 of the Lanham Act, be "incontestable" to a different extent in each of
the two states.
,' Sees. 2(d), 7(a), 6o STAT. 428, 15 U. S. C. S052(d), 6o STAT. 430, X5 U. S. C. §1057(a) (1946).
See Diggins, The Lanham Trade-Mark Act, 37 T. M. Rep. 305 (1947). The Act does not in terms
limit concurrent registrations to territorially limited marks and indicates that marks which differ as to
"mode or place of use" or goods may be registered concurrently. Sec. 2(d). However, differences in
mode of use or goods would make confusion, mistake, or deceit of purchasers unlikely, and the Patent
Office in acting upon applications for registration is apparently construing the concurrent-use provisions
of the Lanham Act as differing from prior law only in permitting concurrent registrations of marks used
in different territories. Derenberg, The Lanham Act of r946, Practical Effects and Experiences After
One Year's Administration, 38 T. M. Rep. 831, 849 (1948), states: "The basic idea of Sec. 2(d) .. .
was to permit registration of marks concurrently used in different parts of this country .. ." See also Hal-
liday, Geography of Trade-Marks, Concurrent Use and Registrations (Practising Law Institute Lecture, Dec.
4, 5947.)
144 Sec. 2(d).
1
.Se note 132 supra. See also Sec. 7(b), 6o STrAT. 430, 15 U. S. C. §1057(b) (1946).
1
"Sec. 22. See note 130 supra.
1476o SrAT. 438, 15 U. S. C. §x115(a) (1946).
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the meaning of the Act involves construction of a federal statute and is therefore a
matter -for the independent judgment of the federal courts. 48
There may be some question whether recourse to state law would be necessary
in the case of some types of "defect." Prior to the effective date of the Lanham Act,
acquisition of trade-mark rights "rested upon the laws of the several states." '
If the defect relied upon were a defect in the acquisition, it would seem to be
essential to examine the law of the state under which the mark was acquired to
determine whether the acquisition was in fact defective.
As pointed out above, valid local rights acquired prior to publication of a
registered mark are effective against the "right of the registrant to use" such mark,150
and such local rights also constitute a defense against "the registrant's exclusive
right to use" '' such mark even though the registration may have become incontest-
able. This defensive effect of such marks is, unlike the exclusionary effect described
above,""- a matter of federal rather than state law. The Lanham Act specifies the
conditions under which and the extent to which such local marks constitute a de-
fense against an incontestable registration, so that the defense involves interpretation
and application of the Act itself.
VI
UNFAIR COMPEnTION
The establishment of a substantive federal law of unfair competition does not
present the same constitutional difficulty as a substantive federal law of trade-marks
because, while trade-mark infringement is a species of unfair competition, specialized
legal rules and concepts have been developed for the protection of trade-marks. 88
Even local trade-marks are property which Congress cannot constitutionally destroy;
but while one may have a right to compete with another, no one has or can have
a vested right to compete unfairly. From time to time federal laws'5 4 have pro-
hibited various forms and types of unfair competition,=5 and the prohibitions of
these laws have been effective even in instances where most or all of the acts con-
stituting the prohibited practice have preceded the effective date of the federal law.1' 0
The Lanham Act merely makes unfair competition a matter of federal law and
leaves it to the federal courts to determine what competitive acts, conduct, or prac-
: Jerome v. United States, supra note 83.
"~' American Trading Co. v. Heacock Co., 285 U. S. 247, 258 (1932).
1
o Sec. z 5 . 6o STAT. 433, 15 U. S. C. §xo65 (1946).
'Sec. 33. 6o STAT. 438, 15 U. S. C. §1115 (946).
252 Sec. 33 (b)(5). 6o STAT. 438, 15 U. S. C. §IIX5(b)(5) 1946.
" "The infringement of a trade-mark, for instance, is conceived as an invasion of property....
Unfair competition, on the other hand, cannot be placed on the plane of invasion of property right. This
tort is strictly one of fraud, and a fraudulent intent or its equivalent is essential to liability." I THOMAS
ATKINS STREET, THE FouNnkTIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 421 (19o6).
1.4 The principal examples are the Sherman Act, 26 STAT. 209 (18go), as amended, I5 U. S. C. §1
(1946); the Clayton Act, 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U. S. C. §12 (1946); and the Federal Trade Com.
mission Act, 38 STAT. 717 (914), as amended, 15 U. S. C. §41 (1946).
.. Handler, Unfair Competition, 21 IowA L. Rav. 175, 214 et seq. (1936).
158 Cf. United States v. Pullman Co., 64 F. Supp. xo8 (E. D. Pa. 1946).
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tices are "unfair." The Act does not in terms prohibit or make actionable acts or
practices which were lawful when done, but, in effect, provides that there shall be a
uniform federal law of unfair competition. Unfair competition is actionable at
common law,'17 and a change in the scope of actionable unfair competition by
judicial decision, even though retrospective in effect, would not be unconstitu-
tional.15
VII
CONCLUSION
The Lanham Act provides a uniform federal law of trade-marks and unfair
competition which is controlling in all cases and situations affecting interstate or
foreign commerce. The ever-expanding judicial concept of the commerce power
of Congress makes the Act effective in substantially all trade-mark and unfair
competition cases without recourse to state law. The Act eliminates most of the
effects of the Eric decision in trade-mark and unfair competition cases, and thereby
eliminates the uncertainty and confusion which resulted from the application of
state law.
So far as trade-marks are concerned, the Lanham Act recognizes, preserves, and
protects trade-mark rights existing at the effective date of the Act. To a limited
extent, these rights necessitate recourse to the laws of the states under which such
rights exist. However, as time passes, trade-mark rights existing at the effective
date of the Act will probably either fall into disuse or qualify for registration and be
registered under the Lanham Act. The Act is so drafted that, after a relatively few
years, it may be expected that the state law of trade-marks and unfair competition
will be of little more than historical interest.
1" Handler, supra note 155, at 179 et seq.
110 Cf. United States v. General Electric Co., 8o F. Supp. 989 (S. D. N. Y. r948).
